Network Working Group J. Pinkerton
Request for Comments: 5042 Microsoft Corporation
Category: Standards Track E. Deleganes
Self
October 2007
Direct Data Placement Protocol (DDP) /
Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMAP) Security
Status of This Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Abstract
This document analyzes security issues around implementation and use
of the Direct Data Placement Protocol (DDP) and Remote Direct Memory
Access Protocol (RDMAP). It first defines an architectural model for
an RDMA Network Interface Card (RNIC), which can implement DDP or
RDMAP and DDP. The document reviews various attacks against the
resources defined in the architectural model and the countermeasures
that can be used to protect the system. Attacks are grouped into
those that can be mitigated by using secure communication channels
across the network, attacks from Remote Peers, and attacks from Local
Peers. Attack categories include spoofing, tampering, information
disclosure, denial of service, and elevation of privilege.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................4
2. Architectural Model .............................................6
2.1. Components .................................................7
2.2. Resources ..................................................9
2.2.1. Stream Context Memory ...............................9
2.2.2. Data Buffers .......................................10
2.2.3. Page Translation Tables ............................10
2.2.4. Protection Domain (PD) .............................11
2.2.5. STag Namespace and Scope ...........................11
2.2.6. Completion Queues ..................................12
2.2.7. Asynchronous Event Queue ...........................12
2.2.8. RDMA Read Request Queue ............................13
2.3. RNIC Interactions .........................................13
2.3.1. Privileged Control Interface Semantics .............13
2.3.2. Non-Privileged Data Interface Semantics ............13
2.3.3. Privileged Data Interface Semantics ................14
2.3.4. Initialization of RNIC Data Structures for
Data Transfer ......................................14
2.3.5. RNIC Data Transfer Interactions ....................16
3. Trust and Resource Sharing .....................................17
4. Attacker Capabilities ..........................................18
5. Attacks That Can Be Mitigated with End-to-End Security .........18
5.1. Spoofing ..................................................19
5.1.1. Impersonation ......................................19
5.1.2. Stream Hijacking ...................................20
5.1.3. Man-in-the-Middle Attack ...........................20
5.2. Tampering - Network-Based Modification of Buffer Content ..21
5.3. Information Disclosure - Network-Based Eavesdropping ......21
5.4. Specific Requirements for Security Services ...............21
5.4.1. Introduction to Security Options ...................21
5.4.2. TLS Is Inappropriate for DDP/RDMAP Security ........22
5.4.3. DTLS and RDDP ......................................23
5.4.4. ULPs That Provide Security .........................23
5.4.5. Requirements for IPsec Encapsulation of DDP ........23
6. Attacks from Remote Peers ......................................24
6.1. Spoofing ..................................................25
6.1.1. Using an STag on a Different Stream ................25
6.2. Tampering .................................................26
6.2.1. Buffer Overrun - RDMA Write or Read Response .......26
6.2.2. Modifying a Buffer after Indication ................27
6.2.3. Multiple STags to Access the Same Buffer ...........27
6.3. Information Disclosure ....................................28
6.3.1. Probing Memory Outside of the Buffer Bounds ........28
6.3.2. Using RDMA Read to Access Stale Data ...............28
6.3.3. Accessing a Buffer after the Transfer ..............28
6.3.4. Accessing Unintended Data with a Valid STag ........29
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
6.3.5. RDMA Read into an RDMA Write Buffer ................29
6.3.6. Using Multiple STags That Alias to the Same
Buffer .............................................29
6.4. Denial of Service (DOS) ...................................30
6.4.1. RNIC Resource Consumption ..........................30
6.4.2. Resource Consumption by Idle ULPs ..................31
6.4.3. Resource Consumption by Active ULPs ................32
6.4.3.1. Multiple Streams Sharing Receive Buffers ..32
6.4.3.2. Remote or Local Peer Attacking a
Shared CQ .................................34
6.4.3.3. Attacking the RDMA Read Request Queue .....36
6.4.4. Exercise of Non-Optimal Code Paths .................37
6.4.5. Remote Invalidate an STag Shared on
Multiple Streams ...................................37
6.4.6. Remote Peer Attacking an Unshared CQ ...............38
6.5. Elevation of Privilege ....................................38
7. Attacks from Local Peers .......................................38
7.1. Local ULP Attacking a Shared CQ ...........................39
7.2. Local Peer Attacking the RDMA Read Request Queue ..........39
7.3. Local ULP Attacking the PTT and STag Mapping ..............39
8. Security considerations ........................................40
9. IANA Considerations ............................................40
10. References ....................................................40
10.1. Normative References .....................................40
10.2. Informative References ...................................41
Appendix A. ULP Issues for RDDP Client/Server Protocols ...........43
Appendix B. Summary of RNIC and ULP Implementation Requirements ...46
Appendix C. Partial Trust Taxonomy ................................47
Acknowledgments ...................................................49
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 3]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
1. Introduction
RDMA enables new levels of flexibility when communicating between two
parties compared to current conventional networking practice (e.g., a
stream-based model or datagram model). This flexibility brings new
security issues that must be carefully understood when designing
Upper Layer Protocols (ULPs) utilizing RDMA and when implementing
RDMA-aware NICs (RNICs). Note that for the purposes of this security
analysis, an RNIC may implement RDMAP [RDMAP] and DDP [DDP], or just
DDP. Also, a ULP may be an application or it may be a middleware
library.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
Additionally, the security terminology defined in [RFC4949] is used
in this specification.
The document first develops an architectural model that is relevant
for the security analysis. Section 2 details components, resources,
and system properties that may be attacked. The document uses Local
Peer to represent the RDMA/DDP protocol implementation on the local
end of a Stream (implemented with a transport protocol, such as
[RFC793] or [RFC4960]). The local Upper-Layer-Protocol (ULP) is used
to represent the application or middle-ware layer above the Local
Peer. The document does not attempt to differentiate between a
Remote Peer and a Remote ULP (an RDMA/DDP protocol implementation on
the remote end of a Stream versus the application on the remote end)
for several reasons: often, the source of the attack is difficult to
know for sure and, regardless of the source, the mitigations required
of the Local Peer or local ULP are the same. Thus, the document
generically refers to a Remote Peer rather than trying to further
delineate the attacker.
The document then defines what resources a local ULP may share across
Streams and what resources the local ULP may share with the Remote
Peer across Streams in Section 3.
Intentional sharing of resources between multiple Streams may imply
some level of trust between the Streams. However, some types of
resource sharing have unmitigated security attacks, which would
mandate not sharing a specific type of resource unless there is some
level of trust between the Streams sharing resources.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 4]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
This document defines a new term, "Partial Mutual Trust", to address
this concept:
Partial Mutual Trust - a collection of RDMAP/DDP Streams, which
represent the local and remote end points of the Stream that are
willing to assume that the Streams from the collection will not
perform malicious attacks against any of the other Streams in the
collection.
ULPs have explicit control of which collection of endpoints is in a
Partial Mutual Trust collection through tools discussed in Appendix
C, Partial Trust Taxonomy.
An untrusted peer relationship is appropriate when a ULP wishes to
ensure that it will be robust and uncompromised even in the face of a
deliberate attack by its peer. For example, a single ULP that
concurrently supports multiple unrelated Streams (e.g., a server)
would presumably treat each of its peers as an untrusted peer. For a
collection of Streams that share Partial Mutual Trust, the assumption
is that any Stream not in the collection is untrusted. For the
untrusted peer, a brief list of capabilities is enumerated in Section
4.
The rest of the document is focused on analyzing attacks and
recommending specific mitigations to the attacks. Attacks are
categorized into attacks mitigated by end-to-end security, attacks
initiated by Remote Peers, and attacks initiated by Local Peers. For
each attack, possible countermeasures are reviewed.
ULPs within a host are divided into two categories - Privileged and
Non-Privileged. Both ULP types can send and receive data and request
resources. The key differences between the two are:
The Privileged ULP is trusted by the local system not to
maliciously attack the operating environment, but it is not
trusted to optimize resource allocation globally. For example,
the Privileged ULP could be a kernel ULP; thus, the kernel
presumably has in some way vetted the ULP before allowing it to
execute.
A Non-Privileged ULP's capabilities are a logical sub-set of the
Privileged ULP's. It is assumed by the local system that a Non-
Privileged ULP is untrusted. All Non-Privileged ULP interactions
with the RNIC Engine that could affect other ULPs need to be done
through a trusted intermediary that can verify the Non-Privileged
ULP requests.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 5]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
The appendices provide focused summaries of this specification.
Appendix A, ULP Issues for RDDP Client/Server Protocols, focuses on
implementers of traditional client/server protocols. Appendix B,
Summary of RNIC and ULP Implementation Requirements, summarizes all
normative requirements in this specification. Appendix C, Partial
Trust Taxonomy, provides an abstract model for categorizing trust
boundaries.
If an RDMAP/DDP protocol implementation uses the mitigations
recommended in this document, that implementation should not exhibit
additional security vulnerabilities above and beyond those of an
implementation of the transport protocol (i.e., TCP or SCTP) and
protocols beneath it (e.g., IP) without RDMAP/DDP.
2. Architectural Model
This section describes an RDMA architectural reference model that is
used as security issues are examined. It introduces the components
of the model, the resources that can be attacked, the types of
interactions possible between components and resources, and the
system properties that must be preserved.
Figure 1 shows the components comprising the architecture and the
interfaces where potential security attacks could be launched.
External attacks can be injected into the system from a ULP that sits
above the RNIC Interface or from the network.
The intent here is to describe high level components and capabilities
that affect threat analysis, and not focus on specific implementation
options. Also note that the architectural model is an abstraction,
and an actual implementation may choose to subdivide its components
along different boundary lines from those defined here. For example,
the Privileged Resource Manager may be partially or completely
encapsulated in the Privileged ULP. Regardless, it is expected that
the security analysis of the potential threats and countermeasures
still apply.
Note that the model below is derived from several specific RDMA
implementations. A few of note are [VERBS-RDMAC], [VERBS-RDMAC-
Overview], and [INFINIBAND].
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 6]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
+-------------+
| Privileged |
| Resource |
Admin<-+>| Manager | ULP Control Interface
| | |<------+-------------------+
| +-------------+ | |
| ^ v v
| | +-------------+ +-----------------+
+---------------->| Privileged | | Non-Privileged |
| | ULP | | ULP |
| +-------------+ +-----------------+
| ^ ^
|Privileged |Privileged |Non-Privileged
|Control |Data |Data
|Interface |Interface |Interface
RNIC | | |
Interface v v v
=================================================================
+--------------------------------------+
| |
| RNIC Engine |
| |
+--------------------------------------+
^
|
v
Internet
Figure 1 - RDMA Security Model
2.1. Components
The components shown in Figure 1 - RDMA Security Model are:
* RDMA Network Interface Controller Engine (RNIC) - The component
that implements the RDMA protocol and/or DDP protocol.
* Privileged Resource Manager - The component responsible for
managing and allocating resources associated with the RNIC
Engine. The Resource Manager does not send or receive data.
Note that whether the Resource Manager is an independent
component, part of the RNIC, or part of the ULP is implementation
dependent.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 7]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
* Privileged ULP - See Section 1, Introduction, for a definition of
Privileged ULP. The local host infrastructure can enable the
Privileged ULP to map a Data Buffer directly from the RNIC Engine
to the host through the RNIC Interface, but it does not allow the
Privileged ULP to directly consume RNIC Engine resources.
* Non-Privileged ULP - See Section 1, Introduction, for a
definition of Non-Privileged ULP.
A design goal of the DDP and RDMAP protocols is to allow, under
constrained conditions, Non-Privileged ULP to send and receive data
directly to/from the RDMA Engine without Privileged Resource Manager
intervention, while ensuring that the host remains secure. Thus, one
of the primary goals of this document is to analyze this usage model
for the enforcement that is required in the RNIC Engine to ensure
that the system remains secure.
DDP provides two mechanisms for transferring data:
* Untagged Data Transfer - The incoming payload simply consumes the
first buffer in a queue of buffers that are in the order
specified by the receiving Peer (commonly referred to as the
Receive Queue), and
* Tagged Data Transfer - The Peer transmitting the payload
explicitly states which destination buffer is targeted, through
use of an STag. STag-based transfers allow the receiving ULP to
be indifferent to what order (or in what messages) the opposite
Peer sent the data, or in what order packets are received.
Both data transfer mechanisms are also enabled through RDMAP, with
additional control semantics. Typically, Tagged Data Transfer can be
used for payload transfer, while Untagged Data Transfer is best used
for control messages. However, each Upper Layer Protocol can
determine the optimal use of Tagged and Untagged messages for itself.
See [APPLICABILITY] for more information on application applicability
for the two transfer mechanisms.
For DDP, the two forms correspond to Untagged and Tagged DDP
Messages, respectively. For RDMAP, the two forms correspond to Send
Type Messages and RDMA Messages (either RDMA Read or RDMA Write
Messages), respectively.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 8]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
The host interfaces that could be exercised include:
* Privileged Control Interface - A Privileged Resource Manager uses
the RNIC Interface to allocate and manage RNIC Engine resources,
control the state within the RNIC Engine, and monitor various
events from the RNIC Engine. It also uses this interface to act
as a proxy for some operations that a Non-Privileged ULP may
require (after performing appropriate countermeasures).
* ULP Control Interface - A ULP uses this interface to the
Privileged Resource Manager to allocate RNIC Engine resources.
The Privileged Resource Manager implements countermeasures to
ensure that, if the Non-Privileged ULP launches an attack, it can
prevent the attack from affecting other ULPs.
* Non-Privileged Data Transfer Interface - A Non-Privileged ULP
uses this interface to initiate and check the status of data
transfer operations.
* Privileged Data Transfer Interface - A superset of the
functionality provided by the Non-Privileged Data Transfer
Interface. The ULP is allowed to directly manipulate RNIC Engine
mapping resources to map an STag to a ULP Data Buffer.
If Internet control messages, such as ICMP, ARP, RIPv4, etc. are
processed by the RNIC Engine, the threat analyses for those protocols
is also applicable, but outside the scope of this document.
2.2. Resources
This section describes the primary resources in the RNIC Engine that
could be affected if under attack. For RDMAP, all the defined
resources apply. For DDP, all the resources except the RDMA Read
Queue apply.
2.2.1. Stream Context Memory
The state information for each Stream is maintained in memory, which
could be located in a number of places - on the NIC, inside RAM
attached to the NIC, in host memory, or in any combination of the
three, depending on the implementation.
Stream Context Memory includes state associated with Data Buffers.
For Tagged Buffers, this includes how STag names, Data Buffers, and
Page Translation Tables (see Section 2.2.3) interrelate. It also
includes the list of Untagged Data Buffers posted for reception of
Untagged Messages (commonly called the Receive Queue), and a list of
operations to perform to send data (commonly called the Send Queue).
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 9]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
2.2.2. Data Buffers
As mentioned previously, there are two different ways to expose a
local ULP's Data Buffers for data transfer: Untagged Data Transfer,
where a buffer can be exposed for receiving RDMAP Send Type Messages
(a.k.a. DDP Untagged Messages) on DDP Queue zero, or Tagged Data
Transfer, where the buffer can be exposed for remote access through
STags (a.k.a. DDP Tagged Messages). This distinction is important
because the attacks and the countermeasures used to protect against
the attack are different depending on the method for exposing the
buffer to the network.
For the purposes of the security discussion, for Tagged Data
Transfer, a single logical Data Buffer is exposed with a single STag
on a given Stream. Actual implementations may support scatter/gather
capabilities to enable multiple physical data buffers to be accessed
with a single STag, but from a threat analysis perspective, it is
assumed that a single STag enables access to a single logical Data
Buffer.
In any event, it is the responsibility of the Privileged Resource
Manager to ensure that no STag can be created that exposes memory
that the consumer had no authority to expose.
A Data Buffer has specific access rights. The local ULP can control
whether a Data Buffer is exposed for local only, or local and remote
access, and assign specific access privileges (read, write, read and
write) on a per Stream basis.
For DDP, when an STag is Advertised, the Remote Peer is presumably
given write access rights to the data (otherwise, there would not be
much point to the Advertisement). For RDMAP, when a ULP Advertises
an STag, it can enable write-only, read-only, or both write and read
access rights.
Similarly, some ULPs may wish to provide a single buffer with
different access rights on a per Stream basis. For example, some
Streams may have read-only access, some may have remote read and
write access, while on other Streams, only the local ULP/Local Peer
is allowed access.
2.2.3. Page Translation Tables
Page Translation Tables are the structures used by the RNIC to be
able to access ULP memory for data transfer operations. Even though
these structures are called "Page" Translation Tables, they may not
reference a page at all - conceptually, they are used to map a ULP
address space representation (e.g., a virtual address) of a buffer to
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
the physical addresses that are used by the RNIC Engine to move data.
If, on a specific system, a mapping is not used, then a subset of the
attacks examined may be appropriate. Note that the Page Translation
Table may or may not be a shared resource.
2.2.4. Protection Domain (PD)
A Protection Domain (PD) is a local construct to the RDMA
implementation, and never visible over the wire. Protection Domains
are assigned to three of the resources of concern - Stream Context
Memory, STags associated with Page Translation Table entries, and
Data Buffers. A correct implementation of a Protection Domain
requires that resources that belong to a given Protection Domain
cannot be used on a resource belonging to another Protection Domain,
because Protection Domain membership is checked by the RNIC prior to
taking any action involving such a resource. Protection Domains are
therefore used to ensure that an STag can only be used to access an
associated Data Buffer on one or more Streams that are associated
with the same Protection Domain as the specific STag.
If an implementation chooses not to share resources between Streams,
it is recommended that each Stream be associated with its own, unique
Protection Domain. If an implementation chooses to allow resource
sharing, it is recommended that Protection Domain be limited to the
collection of Streams that have Partial Mutual Trust with each other.
Note that a ULP (either Privileged or Non-Privileged) can potentially
have multiple Protection Domains. This could be used, for example,
to ensure that multiple clients of a server do not have the ability
to corrupt each other. The server would allocate a Protection Domain
per client to ensure that resources covered by the Protection Domain
could not be used by another (untrusted) client.
2.2.5. STag Namespace and Scope
The DDP specification defines a 32-bit namespace for the STag.
Implementations may vary in terms of the actual number of STags that
are supported. In any case, this is a bounded resource that can come
under attack. Depending upon STag namespace allocation algorithms,
the actual name space to attack may be significantly less than 2^32.
The scope of an STag is the set of DDP/RDMAP Streams on which the
STag is valid. If an STag is valid on a particular DDP/RDMAP Stream,
then that stream can modify the buffer, subject to the access rights
that the stream has for the STag (see Section 2.2.2, Data Buffers,
for additional information).
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 11]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
The analysis presented in this document assumes two mechanisms for
limiting the scope of Streams for which the STag is valid:
* Protection Domain scope. The STag is valid if used on any Stream
within a specific Protection Domain, and is invalid if used on
any Stream that is not a member of the Protection Domain.
* Single Stream scope. The STag is valid on a single Stream,
regardless of what the Stream association is to a Protection
Domain. If used on any other Stream, it is invalid.
2.2.6. Completion Queues
Completion Queues (CQ) are used in this document to conceptually
represent how the RNIC Engine notifies the ULP about the completion
of the transmission of data, or the completion of the reception of
data through the Data Transfer Interface (specifically for Untagged
Data Transfer; Tagged Data Transfer cannot cause a completion to
occur). Because there could be many transmissions or receptions in
flight at any one time, completions are modeled as a queue rather
than as a single event. An implementation may also use the
Completion Queue to notify the ULP of other activities; for example,
the completion of a mapping of an STag to a specific ULP buffer.
Completion Queues may be shared by a group of Streams, or may be
designated to handle a specific Stream's traffic. Limiting
Completion Queue association to one, or a small number, of RDMAP/DDP
Streams can prevent several forms of attacks by sharply limiting the
scope of the attack's effect.
Some implementations may allow this queue to be manipulated directly
by both Non-Privileged and Privileged ULPs.
2.2.7. Asynchronous Event Queue
The Asynchronous Event Queue is a queue from the RNIC to the
Privileged Resource Manager of bounded size. It is used by the RNIC
to notify the host of various events that might require management
action, including protocol violations, Stream state changes, local
operation errors, low water marks on receive queues, and possibly
other events.
The Asynchronous Event Queue is a resource that can be attacked
because Remote or Local Peers and/or ULPs can cause events to occur
that have the potential of overflowing the queue.
Note that an implementation is at liberty to implement the functions
of the Asynchronous Event Queue in a variety of ways, including
multiple queues or even simple callbacks. All vulnerabilities
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 12]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
identified are intended to apply, regardless of the implementation of
the Asynchronous Event Queue. For example, a callback function may
be viewed simply as a very short queue.
2.2.8. RDMA Read Request Queue
The RDMA Read Request Queue is the memory that holds state
information for one or more RDMA Read Request Messages that have
arrived, but for which the RDMA Read Response Messages have not yet
been completely sent. Because potentially more than one RDMA Read
Request can be outstanding at one time, the memory is modeled as a
queue of bounded size. Some implementations may enable sharing of a
single RDMA Read Request Queue across multiple Streams.
2.3. RNIC Interactions
With RNIC resources and interfaces defined, it is now possible to
examine the interactions supported by the generic RNIC functional
interfaces through each of the 3 interfaces: Privileged Control
Interface, Privileged Data Interface, and Non-Privileged Data
Interface. As mentioned previously in Section 2.1, Components, there
are two data transfer mechanisms to be examined, Untagged Data
Transfer and Tagged Data Transfer.
2.3.1. Privileged Control Interface Semantics
Generically, the Privileged Control Interface controls the RNIC's
allocation, de-allocation, and initialization of RNIC global
resources. This includes allocation and de-allocation of Stream
Context Memory, Page Translation Tables, STag names, Completion
Queues, RDMA Read Request Queues, and Asynchronous Event Queues.
The Privileged Control Interface is also typically used for managing
Non-Privileged ULP resources for the Non-Privileged ULP (and possibly
for the Privileged ULP as well). This includes initialization and
removal of Page Translation Table resources, and managing RNIC events
(possibly managing all events for the Asynchronous Event Queue).
2.3.2. Non-Privileged Data Interface Semantics
The Non-Privileged Data Interface enables data transfer (transmit and
receive) but does not allow initialization of the Page Translation
Table resources. However, once the Page Translation Table resources
have been initialized, the interface may enable a specific STag
mapping to be enabled and disabled by directly communicating with the
RNIC, or create an STag mapping for a buffer that has been previously
initialized in the RNIC.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 13]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
For RDMAP, ULP data can be sent by one of the previously described
data transfer mechanisms: Untagged Data Transfer or Tagged Data
Transfer. Two RDMAP data transfer mechanisms are defined, one using
Untagged Data Transfer (Send Type Messages), and one using Tagged
Data Transfer (RDMA Read Responses and RDMA Writes). ULP data
reception through RDMAP can be done by receiving Send Type Messages
into buffers that have been posted on the Receive Queue or Shared
Receive Queue. Thus, a Receive Queue or Shared Receive Queue can
only be affected by Untagged Data Transfer. Data reception can also
be done by receiving RDMA Write and RDMA Read Response Messages into
buffers that have previously been exposed for external write access
through Advertisement of an STag (i.e., Tagged Data Transfer).
Additionally, to cause ULP data to be pulled (read) across the
network, RDMAP uses an RDMA Read Request Message (which only contains
RDMAP control information necessary to access the ULP buffer to be
read), to cause an RDMA Read Response Message to be generated that
contains the ULP data.
For DDP, transmitting data means sending DDP Tagged or Untagged
Messages. For data reception, DDP can receive Untagged Messages into
buffers that have been posted on the Receive Queue or Shared Receive
Queue. It can also receive Tagged DDP Messages into buffers that
have previously been exposed for external write access through
Advertisement of an STag.
Completion of data transmission or reception generally entails
informing the ULP of the completed work by placing completion
information on the Completion Queue. For data reception, only an
Untagged Data Transfer can cause completion information to be put in
the Completion Queue.
2.3.3. Privileged Data Interface Semantics
The Privileged Data Interface semantics are a superset of the Non-
Privileged Data Transfer semantics. The interface can do everything
defined in the prior section, as well as create/destroy buffer to
STag mappings directly. This generally entails initialization or
clearing of Page Translation Table state in the RNIC.
2.3.4. Initialization of RNIC Data Structures for Data Transfer
Initialization of the mapping between an STag and a Data Buffer can
be viewed in the abstract as two separate operations:
a. Initialization of the allocated Page Translation Table entries
with the location of the Data Buffer, and
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 14]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
b. Initialization of a mapping from an allocated STag name to a set
of Page Translation Table entry(s) or partial entries.
Note that an implementation may not have a Page Translation Table
(i.e., it may support a direct mapping between an STag and a Data
Buffer). If there is no Page Translation Table, then attacks based
on changing its contents or exhausting its resources are not
possible.
Initialization of the contents of the Page Translation Table can be
done by either the Privileged ULP or by the Privileged Resource
Manager as a proxy for the Non-Privileged ULP. By definition, the
Non-Privileged ULP is not trusted to directly manipulate the Page
Translation Table. In general, the concern is that the Non-
Privileged ULP may try to maliciously initialize the Page Translation
Table to access a buffer for which it does not have permission.
The exact resource allocation algorithm for the Page Translation
Table is outside the scope of this document. It may be allocated for
a specific Data Buffer, or as a pooled resource to be consumed by
potentially multiple Data Buffers, or be managed in some other way.
This document attempts to abstract implementation dependent issues,
and group them into higher level security issues, such as resource
starvation and sharing of resources between Streams.
The next issue is how an STag name is associated with a Data Buffer.
For the case of an Untagged Data Buffer (i.e., Untagged Data
Transfer), there is no wire visible mapping between an STag and the
Data Buffer. Note that there may, in fact, be an STag that
represents the buffer, if an implementation chooses to internally
represent Untagged Data Buffer using STags. However, because the
STag, by definition, is not visible on the wire, this is a local
host, implementation-specific issue that should be analyzed in the
context of a local host implementation-specific security analysis,
and thus, is outside the scope of this document.
For a Tagged Data Buffer (i.e., Tagged Data Transfer), either the
Privileged ULP or the Privileged Resource Manager acting on behalf of
the Non-Privileged ULP may initialize a mapping from an STag to a
Page Translation Table, or may have the ability to simply
enable/disable an existing STag to Page Translation Table mapping.
There may also be multiple STag names that map to a specific group of
Page Translation Table entries (or sub-entries). Specific security
issues with this level of flexibility are examined in Section 6.2.3,
Multiple STags to Access the Same Buffer.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 15]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
There are a variety of implementation options for initialization of
Page Translation Table entries and mapping an STag to a group of Page
Translation Table entries that have security repercussions. This
includes support for separation of mapping an STag versus mapping a
set of Page Translation Table entries, and support for ULPs directly
manipulating STag to Page Translation Table entry mappings (versus
requiring access through the Privileged Resource Manager).
2.3.5. RNIC Data Transfer Interactions
RNIC Data Transfer operations can be subdivided into send and receive
operations.
For send operations, there is typically a queue that enables the ULP
to post multiple operation requests to send data (referred to as the
Send Queue). Depending upon the implementation, Data Buffers used in
the operations may or may not have Page Translation Table entries
associated with them, and may or may not have STags associated with
them. Because this is a local host specific implementation issue
rather than a protocol issue, the security analysis of threats and
mitigations is left to the host implementation.
Receive operations are different for Tagged Data Buffers versus
Untagged Data Buffers (i.e., Tagged Data Transfer vs. Untagged Data
Transfer). For Untagged Data Transfer, if more than one Untagged
Data Buffer can be posted by the ULP, the DDP specification requires
that they be consumed in sequential order (the RDMAP specification
also requires this). Thus, the most general implementation is that
there is a sequential queue of receive Untagged Data Buffers (Receive
Queue). Some implementations may also support sharing of the
sequential queue between multiple Streams. In this case, defining
"sequential" becomes non-trivial - in general, the buffers for a
single Stream are consumed from the queue in the order that they were
placed on the queue, but there is no consumption order guarantee
between Streams.
For receive Tagged Data Transfer (i.e., Tagged Data Buffers, RDMA
Write Buffers, or RDMA Read Buffers), at some time prior to data
transfer, the mapping of the STag to specific Page Translation Table
entries (if present) and the mapping from the Page Translation Table
entries to the Data Buffer must have been initialized (see Section
2.3.4 for interaction details).
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 16]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
3. Trust and Resource Sharing
It is assumed that, in general, the Local and Remote Peer are
untrusted, and thus attacks by either should have mitigations in
place.
A separate, but related issue is resource sharing between multiple
Streams. If local resources are not shared, the resources are
dedicated on a per Stream basis. Resources are defined in Section
2.2, Resources. The advantage of not sharing resources between
Streams is that it reduces the types of attacks that are possible.
The disadvantage of not sharing resources is that ULPs might run out
of resources. Thus, there can be a strong incentive for sharing
resources, if the security issues associated with the sharing of
resources can be mitigated.
It is assumed in this document that the component that implements the
mechanism to control sharing of the RNIC Engine resources is the
Privileged Resource Manager. The RNIC Engine exposes its resources
through the RNIC Interface to the Privileged Resource Manager. All
Privileged and Non-Privileged ULPs request resources from the
Resource Manager (note that by definition both the Non-Privileged and
the Privileged application might try to greedily consume resources,
thus creating a potential Denial of Service (DOS) attack). The
Resource Manager implements resource management policies to ensure
fair access to resources. The Resource Manager should be designed to
take into account security attacks detailed in this document. Note
that for some systems the Privileged Resource Manager may be
implemented within the Privileged ULP.
All Non-Privileged ULP interactions with the RNIC Engine that could
affect other ULPs MUST be done using the Privileged Resource Manager
as a proxy. All ULP resource allocation requests for scarce
resources MUST also be done using a Privileged Resource Manager.
The sharing of resources across Streams should be under the control
of the ULP, both in terms of the trust model the ULP wishes to
operate under, as well as the level of resource sharing the ULP
wishes to give local processes. For more discussion on types of
trust models that combine partial trust and sharing of resources, see
Appendix C, Partial Trust Taxonomy.
The Privileged Resource Manager MUST NOT assume that different
Streams share Partial Mutual Trust unless there is a mechanism to
ensure that the Streams do indeed share Partial Mutual Trust. This
can be done in several ways, including explicit notification from the
ULP that owns the Streams.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 17]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
4. Attacker Capabilities
An attacker's capabilities delimit the types of attacks that the
attacker is able to launch. RDMAP and DDP require that the initial
LLP Stream (and connection) be set up prior to transferring RDMAP/DDP
Messages. This requires at least one round-trip handshake to occur.
If the attacker is not the Remote Peer that created the initial
connection, then the attacker's capabilities can be segmented into
send only capabilities or send and receive capabilities. Attacking
with send only capabilities requires the attacker to first guess the
current LLP Stream parameters before they can attack RNIC resources
(e.g., TCP sequence number). If this class of attacker also has
receive capabilities and the ability to pose as the receiver to the
sender and the sender to the receiver, they are typically referred to
as a "man-in-the-middle" attacker [RFC3552]. A man-in-the-middle
attacker has a much wider ability to attack RNIC resources. The
breadth of attack is essentially the same as that of an attacking
Remote Peer (i.e., the Remote Peer that set up the initial LLP
Stream).
5. Attacks That Can Be Mitigated with End-to-End Security
This section describes the RDMAP/DDP attacks where the only solution
is to implement some form of end-to-end security. The analysis
includes a detailed description of each attack, what is being
attacked, and a description of the countermeasures that can be taken
to thwart the attack.
Some forms of attack involve modifying the RDMAP or DDP payload by a
network-based attacker or involve monitoring the traffic to discover
private information. An effective tool to ensure confidentiality is
to encrypt the data stream through mechanisms, such as IPsec
encryption. Additionally, authentication protocols, such as IPsec
authentication, are an effective tool to ensure the remote entity is
who they claim to be, as well as ensuring that the payload is
unmodified as it traverses the network.
Note that connection setup and tear down is presumed to be done in
stream mode (i.e., no RDMA encapsulation of the payload), so there
are no new attacks related to connection setup/tear down beyond what
is already present in the LLP (e.g., TCP or SCTP). Note, however,
that RDMAP/DDP parameters may be exchanged in stream mode, and if
they are corrupted by an attacker unintended consequences will
result. Therefore, any existing mitigations for LLP Spoofing,
Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, or
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 18]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
Elevation of Privilege continue to apply (and are out of scope of
this document). Thus, the analysis in this section focuses on
attacks that are present, regardless of the LLP Stream type.
Tampering is any modification of the legitimate traffic (machine
internal or network). Spoofing attack is a special case of tampering
where the attacker falsifies an identity of the Remote Peer (identity
can be an IP address, machine name, ULP level identity, etc.).
5.1. Spoofing
Spoofing attacks can be launched by the Remote Peer, or by a
network-based attacker. A network-based spoofing attack applies to
all Remote Peers. This section analyzes the various types of
spoofing attacks applicable to RDMAP and DDP.
5.1.1. Impersonation
A network-based attacker can impersonate a legal RDMAP/DDP Peer (by
spoofing a legal IP address). This can either be done as a blind
attack (see [RFC3552]) or by establishing an RDMAP/DDP Stream with
the victim. Because an RDMAP/DDP Stream requires an LLP Stream to be
fully initialized (e.g., for [RFC793], it is in the ESTABLISHED
state), existing transport layer protection mechanisms against blind
attacks remain in place.
For a blind attack to succeed, it requires the attacker to inject a
valid transport layer segment (e.g., for TCP, it must match at least
the 4-tuple as well as guess a sequence number within the window)
while also guessing valid RDMAP or DDP parameters. There are many
ways to attack the RDMAP/DDP protocol if the transport protocol is
assumed to be vulnerable. For example, for Tagged Messages, this
entails guessing the STag and TO values. If the attacker wishes to
simply terminate the connection, it can do so by correctly guessing
the transport and network layer values, and providing an invalid
STag. Per the DDP specification, if an invalid STag is received, the
Stream is torn down and the Remote Peer is notified with an error.
If an attacker wishes to overwrite an Advertised Buffer, it must
successfully guess the correct STag and TO. Given that the TO will
often start at zero, this is straightforward. The value of the STag
should be chosen at random, as discussed in Section 6.1.1, Using an
STag on a Different Stream. For Untagged Messages, if the MSN is
invalid then the connection may be torn down. If it is valid, then
the receive buffers can be corrupted.
End-to-end authentication (e.g., IPsec or ULP authentication)
provides protection against either the blind attack or the connected
attack.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 19]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
5.1.2. Stream Hijacking
Stream hijacking happens when a network-based attacker eavesdrops on
the LLP connection through the Stream establishment phase, and waits
until the authentication phase (if such a phase exists) is completed
successfully. The attacker then spoofs the IP address and re-directs
the Stream from the victim to its own machine. For example, an
attacker can wait until an iSCSI authentication is completed
successfully, and then hijack the iSCSI Stream.
The best protection against this form of attack is end-to-end
integrity protection and authentication, such as IPsec, to prevent
spoofing. Another option is to provide a physically segregated
network for security. Discussion of physical security is out of
scope for this document.
Because the connection and/or Stream itself is established by the
LLP, some LLPs are more difficult to hijack than others. Please see
the relevant LLP documentation on security issues around connection
and/or Stream hijacking.
5.1.3. Man-in-the-Middle Attack
If a network-based attacker has the ability to delete or modify
packets that will still be accepted by the LLP (e.g., TCP sequence
number is correct), then the Stream can be exposed to a man-in-the-
middle attack. One style of attack is for the man-in-the-middle to
send Tagged Messages (either RDMAP or DDP). If it can discover a
buffer that has been exposed for STag enabled access, then the man-
in-the-middle can use an RDMA Read operation to read the contents of
the associated Data Buffer, perform an RDMA Write Operation to modify
the contents of the associated Data Buffer, or invalidate the STag to
disable further access to the buffer.
The best protection against this form of attack is end-to-end
integrity protection and authentication, such as IPsec, to prevent
spoofing or tampering. If authentication and integrity protections
are not used, then physical protection must be employed to prevent
man-in-the-middle attacks.
Because the connection/Stream itself is established by the LLP, some
LLPs are more exposed to man-in-the-middle attack than others.
Please see the relevant LLP documentation on security issues around
connection and/or Stream hijacking.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 20]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
Another approach is to restrict access to only the local subnet/link,
and provide some mechanism to limit access, such as physical security
or 802.1.x. This model is an extremely limited deployment scenario,
and will not be further examined here.
5.2. Tampering - Network-Based Modification of Buffer Content
This is actually a man-in-the-middle attack, but only on the content
of the buffer, as opposed to the man-in-the-middle attack presented
above, where both the signaling and content can be modified. See
Section 5.1.3, Man-in-the-Middle Attack.
5.3. Information Disclosure - Network-Based Eavesdropping
An attacker that is able to eavesdrop on the network can read the
content of all read and write accesses to a Peer's buffers. To
prevent information disclosure, the read/written data must be
encrypted. See also Section 5.1.3, Man-in-the-Middle Attack. The
encryption can be done either by the ULP, or by a protocol that can
provide security services to RDMAP and DDP (e.g., IPsec).
5.4. Specific Requirements for Security Services
Generally speaking, Stream confidentiality protects against
eavesdropping. Stream and/or session authentication and integrity
protection is a counter measurement against various spoofing and
tampering attacks. The effectiveness of authentication and integrity
against a specific attack depends on whether the authentication is
machine level authentication (such as IPsec), or ULP authentication.
5.4.1. Introduction to Security Options
The following security services can be applied to an RDMAP/DDP
Stream:
1. Session confidentiality - Protects against eavesdropping (Section
5.3).
2. Per-packet data source authentication - Protects against the
following spoofing attacks: network-based impersonation (Section
5.1.1) and Stream hijacking (Section 5.1.2).
3. Per-packet integrity - Protects against tampering done by
network-based modification of buffer content (Section 5.2) and
when combined with authentication, also protects against man-in-
the-middle attacks (Section 5.1.3).
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 21]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
4. Packet sequencing - protects against replay attacks, which is a
special case of the above tampering attack.
If an RDMAP/DDP Stream may be subject to impersonation attacks, or
Stream hijacking attacks, it is recommended that the Stream be
authenticated, integrity protected, and protected from replay
attacks; it may use confidentiality protection to protect from
eavesdropping (in case the RDMAP/DDP Stream traverses a public
network).
IPsec is a protocol suite that is used to secure communication at the
network layer between two peers. The IPsec protocol suite is
specified within the IP Security Architecture [RFC2401], IKE
[RFC2409], IPsec Authentication Header (AH) [RFC2402], and IPsec
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC2406] documents. IKE is the
key management protocol, while AH and ESP are used to protect IP
traffic. Please see those RFCs for a complete description of the
respective protocols.
IPsec is capable of providing the above security services for IP and
TCP traffic, respectively. ULP protocols are able to provide only
part of the above security services.
5.4.2. TLS Is Inappropriate for DDP/RDMAP Security
TLS [RFC4346] provides Stream authentication, integrity and
confidentiality for TCP based ULPs. TLS supports one-way (server
only) or mutual certificates based authentication.
If TLS is layered underneath RDMAP, TLS's connection orientation
makes TLS inappropriate for DDP/RDMA security. If a stream cipher or
block cipher in CBC mode is used for bulk encryption, then a packet
can be decrypted only after all the packets preceding it have already
arrived. If TLS is used to protect DDP/RDMAP traffic, then TCP must
gather all out-of-order packets before TLS can decrypt them. Only
after this is done can RDMAP/DDP place them into the ULP buffer.
Thus, one of the primary features of DDP/RDMAP - enabling
implementations to have a flow-through architecture with little to no
buffering - cannot be achieved if TLS is used to protect the data
stream.
If TLS is layered on top of RDMAP or DDP, TLS does not protect the
RDMAP and/or DDP headers. Thus, a man-in-the-middle attack can still
occur by modifying the RDMAP/DDP header to place the data into the
wrong buffer, thus effectively corrupting the data stream.
For these reasons, it is not RECOMMENDED that TLS be layered on top
of RDMAP or DDP.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 22]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
5.4.3. DTLS and RDDP
DTLS [DTLS] provides security services for datagram protocols,
including unreliable datagram protocols. These services include
anti-replay based on a mechanism adapted from IPsec that is intended
to operate on packets as they are received from the network. For
these and other reasons, DTLS is best applied to RDDP by employing
DTLS beneath TCP, yielding a layering of RDDP over TCP over DTLS over
UDP/IP. Such a layering inserts DTLS at roughly the same level in
the protocol stack as IPsec, making DTLS's security services an
alternative to IPsec's services from an RDDP standpoint.
For RDDP, IPsec is the better choice for a security framework, and
hence is mandatory-to-implement (as specified elsewhere in this
document). An important contributing factor to the specification of
IPsec rather than DTLS is that the non-RDDP versions of two initial
adopters of RDDP (iSCSI [iSCSI][iSER] and NFSv4 [NFSv4][NFSv4.1]) are
compatible with IPsec but neither of these protocols currently uses
either TLS or DTLS. For the specific case of iSCSI, IPsec is the
basis for mandatory-to-implement security services [RFC3723].
Therefore, this document and the RDDP protocol specifications contain
mandatory implementation requirements for IPsec rather than for DTLS.
5.4.4. ULPs That Provide Security
ULPs that provide integrated security but wish to leverage lower-
layer protocol security, should be aware of security concerns around
correlating a specific channel's security mechanisms to the
authentication performed by the ULP. See [NFSv4CHANNEL] for
additional information on a promising approach called "channel
binding". From [NFSv4CHANNEL]:
"The concept of channel bindings allows applications to prove that
the end-points of two secure channels at different network layers
are the same by binding authentication at one channel to the
session protection at the other channel. The use of channel
bindings allows applications to delegate session protection to
lower layers, which may significantly improve performance for some
applications."
5.4.5. Requirements for IPsec Encapsulation of DDP
The IP Storage working group has spent significant time and effort to
define the normative IPsec requirements for IP Storage [RFC3723].
Portions of that specification are applicable to a wide variety of
protocols, including the RDDP protocol suite. In order not to
replicate this effort, an RNIC implementation MUST follow the
requirements defined in RFC 3723, Section 2.3 and Section 5,
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 23]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
including the associated normative references for those sections.
Note that this means that support for IPSEC ESP mode is normative.
Additionally, since IPsec acceleration hardware may only be able to
handle a limited number of active IKE Phase 2 SAs, Phase 2 delete
messages may be sent for idle SAs as a means of keeping the number of
active Phase 2 SAs to a minimum. The receipt of an IKE Phase 2
delete message MUST NOT be interpreted as a reason for tearing down a
DDP/RDMA Stream. Rather, it is preferable to leave the Stream up,
and if additional traffic is sent on it, to bring up another IKE
Phase 2 SA to protect it. This avoids the potential for continually
bringing Streams up and down.
Note that there are serious security issues if IPsec is not
implemented end-to-end. For example, if IPsec is implemented as a
tunnel in the middle of the network, any hosts between the Peer and
the IPsec tunneling device can freely attack the unprotected Stream.
The IPsec requirements for RDDP are based on the version of IPsec
specified in RFC 2401 [RFC2401] and related RFCs, as profiled by RFC
3723 [RFC3723], despite the existence of a newer version of IPsec
specified in RFC 4301 [RFC4301] and related RFCs. One of the
important early applications of the RDDP protocols is their use with
iSCSI [iSER]; RDDP's IPsec requirements follow those of IPsec in
order to facilitate that usage by allowing a common profile of IPsec
to be used with iSCSI and the RDDP protocols. In the future, RFC
3723 may be updated to the newer version of IPsec; the IPsec security
requirements of any such update should apply uniformly to iSCSI and
the RDDP protocols.
6. Attacks from Remote Peers
This section describes remote attacks that are possible against the
RDMA system defined in Figure 1 - RDMA Security Model and the RNIC
Engine resources defined in Section 2.2. The analysis includes a
detailed description of each attack, what is being attacked, and a
description of the countermeasures that can be taken to thwart the
attack.
The attacks are classified into five categories: Spoofing, Tampering,
Information Disclosure, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, and
Elevation of Privileges. As mentioned previously, tampering is any
modification of the legitimate traffic (machine internal or network).
A spoofing attack is a special case of tampering where the attacker
falsifies an identity of the Remote Peer (identity can be an IP
address, machine name, ULP level identity, etc.).
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 24]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
6.1. Spoofing
This section analyzes the various types of spoofing attacks
applicable to RDMAP and DDP. Spoofing attacks can be launched by the
Remote Peer or by a network-based attacker. For countermeasures
against a network-based attacker, see Section 5, Attacks That Can Be
Mitigated with End-to-End Security.
6.1.1. Using an STag on a Different Stream
One style of attack from the Remote Peer is for it to attempt to use
STag values that it is not authorized to use. Note that if the
Remote Peer sends an invalid STag to the Local Peer, per the DDP and
RDMAP specifications, the Stream must be torn down. Thus, the threat
exists if an STag has been enabled for Remote Access on one Stream
and a Remote Peer is able to use it on an unrelated Stream. If the
attack is successful, the attacker could potentially be able to
either perform RDMA Read operations to read the contents of the
associated Data Buffer, perform RDMA Write operations to modify the
contents of the associated data buffer, or invalidate the STag to
disable further access to the buffer.
An attempt by a Remote Peer to access a buffer with an STag on a
different Stream in the same Protection Domain may or may not be an
attack, depending on whether resource sharing is intended (i.e.,
whether the Streams shared Partial Mutual Trust). For some ULPs,
using an STag on multiple Streams within the same Protection Domain
could be desired behavior. For other ULPs, attempting to use an STag
on a different Stream could be considered an attack. Since this
varies by ULP, a ULP typically would need to be able to control the
scope of the STag.
In the case where an implementation does not share resources between
Streams (including STags), this attack can be defeated by assigning
each Stream to a different Protection Domain. Before allowing remote
access to the buffer, the Protection Domain of the Stream where the
access attempt was made is matched against the Protection Domain of
the STag. If the Protection Domains do not match, access to the
buffer is denied, an error is generated, and the RDMAP Stream
associated with the attacking Stream is terminated.
For implementations that share resources between multiple Streams, it
may not be practical to separate each Stream into its own Protection
Domain. In this case, the ULP can still limit the scope of any of
the STags to a single Stream (if it is enabling it for remote
access). If the STag scope has been limited to a single Stream, any
attempt to use that STag on a different Stream will result in an
error, and the RDMAP Stream is terminated.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 25]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
Thus, for implementations that do not share STags between Streams,
each Stream MUST either be in a separate Protection Domain or the
scope of an STag MUST be limited to a single Stream.
An RNIC MUST ensure that a specific Stream in a specific Protection
Domain cannot access an STag in a different Protection Domain.
An RNIC MUST ensure that, if an STag is limited in scope to a single
Stream, no other Stream can use the STag.
An additional issue may be unintended sharing of STags (i.e., a bug
in the ULP) or a bug in the Remote Peer that causes an off-by-one
STag to be used. For additional protection, an implementation should
allocate STags in such a fashion that it is difficult to predict the
next allocated STag number, and also ensure that STags are reused at
as slow a rate as possible. Any allocation method that would lead to
intentional or unintentional reuse of an STag by the peer should be
avoided (e.g., a method that always starts with a given STag and
monotonically increases it for each new allocation, or a method that
always uses the same STag for each operation).
6.2. Tampering
A Remote Peer or a network-based attacker can attempt to tamper with
the contents of Data Buffers on a Local Peer that have been enabled
for remote write access. The types of tampering attacks from a
Remote Peer are outlined in the sections that follow. For
countermeasures against a network-based attacker, see Section 5,
Attacks That Can Be Mitigated with End-to-End Security.
6.2.1. Buffer Overrun - RDMA Write or Read Response
This attack is an attempt by the Remote Peer to perform an RDMA Write
or RDMA Read Response to memory outside of the valid length range of
the Data Buffer enabled for remote write access. This attack can
occur even when no resources are shared across Streams. This issue
can also arise if the ULP has a bug.
The countermeasure for this type of attack must be in the RNIC
implementation, leveraging the STag. When the local ULP specifies to
the RNIC the base address and the umber of bytes in the buffer that
it wishes to make accessible, the RNIC must ensure that the base and
bounds check are applied to any access to the buffer referenced by
the STag before the STag is enabled for access. When an RDMA data
transfer operation (which includes an STag) arrives on a Stream, a
base and bounds byte granularity access check must be performed to
ensure that the operation accesses only memory locations within the
buffer described by that STag.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 26]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
Thus an RNIC implementation MUST ensure that a Remote Peer is not
able to access memory outside of the buffer specified when the STag
was enabled for remote access.
6.2.2. Modifying a Buffer after Indication
This attack can occur if a Remote Peer attempts to modify the
contents of an STag referenced buffer by performing an RDMA Write or
an RDMA Read Response after the Remote Peer has indicated to the
Local Peer or local ULP (by a variety of means) that the STag Data
Buffer contents are ready for use. This attack can occur even when
no resources are shared across Streams. Note that a bug in a Remote
Peer, or network-based tampering, could also result in this problem.
For example, assume that the STag referenced buffer contains ULP
control information as well as ULP payload, and the ULP sequence of
operation is to first validate the control information and then
perform operations on the control information. If the Remote Peer
can perform an additional RDMA Write or RDMA Read Response (thus,
changing the buffer) after the validity checks have been completed
but before the control data is operated on, the Remote Peer could
force the ULP down operational paths that were never intended.
The local ULP can protect itself from this type of attack by revoking
remote access when the original data transfer has completed and
before it validates the contents of the buffer. The local ULP can do
this either by explicitly revoking remote access rights for the STag
when the Remote Peer indicates the operation has completed, or by
checking to make sure the Remote Peer invalidated the STag through
the RDMAP Remote Invalidate capability. If the Remote Peer did not
invalidate the STag, the local ULP then explicitly revokes the STag
remote access rights. (See Section 6.4.5, Remote Invalidate an STag
Shared on Multiple Streams for a definition of Remote Invalidate.)
The local ULP SHOULD follow the above procedure to protect the buffer
before it validates the contents of the buffer (or uses the buffer in
any way).
An RNIC MUST ensure that network packets using the STag for a
previously Advertised Buffer can no longer modify the buffer after
the ULP revokes remote access rights for the specific STag.
6.2.3. Multiple STags to Access the Same Buffer
See Section 6.3.6 Using Multiple STags That Alias to the Same Buffer,
for this analysis.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 27]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
6.3. Information Disclosure
The main potential source for information disclosure is through a
local buffer that has been enabled for remote access. If the buffer
can be probed by a Remote Peer on another Stream, then there is
potential for information disclosure.
The potential attacks that could result in unintended information
disclosure and countermeasures are detailed in the following
sections.
6.3.1. Probing Memory Outside of the Buffer Bounds
This is essentially the same attack as described in Section 6.2.1,
Buffer Overrun - RDMA Write or Read Response, except that an RDMA
Read Request is used to mount the attack. The same countermeasure
applies.
6.3.2. Using RDMA Read to Access Stale Data
If a buffer is being used for some combination of reads and writes
(either remote or local), and is exposed to a Remote Peer with at
least remote read access rights before it is initialized with the
correct data, there is a potential race condition where the Remote
Peer can view the prior contents of the buffer. This becomes a
security issue if the prior contents of the buffer were not intended
to be shared with the Remote Peer.
To eliminate this race condition, the local ULP SHOULD ensure that no
stale data is contained in the buffer before remote read access
rights are granted (this can be done by zeroing the contents of the
memory, for example). This ensures that the Remote Peer cannot
access the buffer until the stale data has been removed.
6.3.3. Accessing a Buffer after the Transfer
If the Remote Peer has remote read access to a buffer and, by some
mechanism, tells the local ULP that the transfer has been completed,
but the local ULP does not disable remote access to the buffer before
modifying the data, it is possible for the Remote Peer to retrieve
the new data.
This is similar to the attack defined in Section 6.2.2, Modifying a
Buffer after Indication. The same countermeasures apply. In
addition, the local ULP SHOULD grant remote read access rights only
for the amount of time needed to retrieve the data.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 28]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
6.3.4. Accessing Unintended Data with a Valid STag
If the ULP enables remote access to a buffer using an STag that
references the entire buffer, but intends only a portion of the
buffer to be accessed, it is possible for the Remote Peer to access
the other parts of the buffer anyway.
To prevent this attack, the ULP SHOULD set the base and bounds of the
buffer when the STag is initialized to expose only the data to be
retrieved.
6.3.5. RDMA Read into an RDMA Write Buffer
One form of disclosure can occur if the access rights on the buffer
enabled remote read, when only remote write access was intended. If
the buffer contained ULP data, or data from a transfer on an
unrelated Stream, the Remote Peer could retrieve the data through an
RDMA Read operation. Note that an RNIC implementation is not
required to support STags that have both read and write access.
The most obvious countermeasure for this attack is to not grant
remote read access if the buffer is intended to be write-only. Then
the Remote Peer would not be able to retrieve data associated with
the buffer. An attempt to do so would result in an error and the
RDMAP Stream associated with the Stream would be terminated.
Thus, if a ULP only intends a buffer to be exposed for remote write
access, it MUST set the access rights to the buffer to only enable
remote write access. Note that this requirement is not meant to
restrict the use of zero-length RDMA Reads. Zero-length RDMA Reads
do not expose ULP data. Because they are intended to be used as a
mechanism to ensure that all RDMA Writes have been received, and do
not even require a valid STag, their use is permitted even if a
buffer has only been enabled for write access.
6.3.6. Using Multiple STags That Alias to the Same Buffer
Multiple STags that alias to the same buffer at the same time can
result in unintentional information disclosure if the STags are used
by different, mutually untrusted Remote Peers. This model applies
specifically to client/server communication, where the server is
communicating with multiple clients, each of which do not mutually
trust each other.
If only read access is enabled, then the local ULP has complete
control over information disclosure. Thus, a server that intended to
expose the same data (i.e., buffer) to multiple clients by using
multiple STags to the same buffer creates no new security issues
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 29]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
beyond what has already been described in this document. Note that
if the server did not intend to expose the same data to the clients,
it should use separate buffers for each client (and separate STags).
When one STag has remote read access enabled and a different STag has
remote write access enabled to the same buffer, it is possible for
one Remote Peer to view the contents that have been written by
another Remote Peer.
If both STags have remote write access enabled and the two Remote
Peers do not mutually trust each other, it is possible for one Remote
Peer to overwrite the contents that have been written by the other
Remote Peer.
Thus, a ULP with multiple Remote Peers that do not share Partial
Mutual Trust MUST NOT grant write access to the same buffer through
different STags. A buffer should be exposed to only one untrusted
Remote Peer at a time to ensure that no information disclosure or
information tampering occurs between peers.
6.4. Denial of Service (DOS)
A DOS attack is one of the primary security risks of RDMAP. This is
because RNIC resources are valuable and scarce, and many ULP
environments require communication with untrusted Remote Peers. If
the Remote Peer can be authenticated or the ULP payload encrypted,
clearly, the DOS profile can be reduced. For the purposes of this
analysis, it is assumed that the RNIC must be able to operate in
untrusted environments, which are open to DOS-style attacks.
Denial of service attacks against RNIC resources are not the typical
unknown party spraying packets at a random host (such as a TCP SYN
attack). Because the connection/Stream must be fully established
(e.g., a 3-message transport layer handshake has occurred), the
attacker must be able to both send and receive messages over that
connection/Stream, or be able to guess a valid packet on an existing
RDMAP Stream.
This section outlines the potential attacks and the countermeasures
available for dealing with each attack.
6.4.1. RNIC Resource Consumption
This section covers attacks that fall into the general category of a
local ULP attempting to unfairly allocate scarce (i.e., bounded) RNIC
resources. The local ULP may be attempting to allocate resources on
its own behalf, or on behalf of a Remote Peer. Resources that fall
into this category include Protection Domains, Stream Context Memory,
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 30]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
Translation and Protection Tables, and STag namespace. These can be
due to attacks by currently active local ULPs or ones that allocated
resources earlier but are now idle.
This type of attack can occur regardless of whether resources are
shared across Streams.
The allocation of all scarce resources MUST be placed under the
control of a Privileged Resource Manager. This allows the Privileged
Resource Manager to:
* prevent a local ULP from allocating more than its fair share of
resources.
* detect if a Remote Peer is attempting to launch a DOS attack by
attempting to create an excessive number of Streams (with
associated resources) and take corrective action (such as
refusing the request or applying network layer filters against
the Remote Peer).
This analysis assumes that the Resource Manager is responsible for
handing out Protection Domains, and that RNIC implementations will
provide enough Protection Domains to allow the Resource Manager to be
able to assign a unique Protection Domain for each unrelated,
untrusted local ULP (for a bounded, reasonable number of local ULPs).
This analysis further assumes that the Resource Manager implements
policies to ensure that untrusted local ULPs are not able to consume
all the Protection Domains through a DOS attack. Note that
Protection Domain consumption cannot result from a DOS attack
launched by a Remote Peer, unless a local ULP is acting on the Remote
Peer's behalf.
6.4.2. Resource Consumption by Idle ULPs
The simplest form of a DOS attack, given a fixed amount of resources,
is for the Remote Peer to create an RDMAP Stream to a Local Peer,
request dedicated resources, and then do no actual work. This allows
the Remote Peer to be very light weight (i.e., only negotiate
resources, but do no data transfer) and consumes a disproportionate
amount of resources at the Local Peer.
A general countermeasure for this style of attack is to monitor
active RDMAP Streams and, if resources are getting low, to reap the
resources from RDMAP Streams that are not transferring data and
possibly terminate the Stream. This would presumably be under
administrative control.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 31]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
Refer to Section 6.4.1 for the analysis and countermeasures for this
style of attack on the following RNIC resources: Stream Context
Memory, Page Translation Tables, and STag namespace.
Note that some RNIC resources are not at risk of this type of attack
from a Remote Peer because an attack requires the Remote Peer to send
messages in order to consume the resource. Receive Data Buffers,
Completion Queue, and RDMA Read Request Queue resources are examples.
These resources are, however, at risk from a local ULP that attempts
to allocate resources, then goes idle. This could also be created if
the ULP negotiates the resource levels with the Remote Peer, which
causes the Local Peer to consume resources; however, the Remote Peer
never sends data to consume them. The general countermeasure
described in this section can be used to free resources allocated by
an idle Local Peer.
6.4.3. Resource Consumption by Active ULPs
This section describes DOS attacks from Local and Remote Peers that
are actively exchanging messages. Attacks on each RDMA NIC resource
are examined and specific countermeasures are identified. Note that
attacks on Stream Context Memory, Page Translation Tables, and STag
namespace are covered in Section 6.4.1, RNIC Resource Consumption, so
they are not included here.
6.4.3.1. Multiple Streams Sharing Receive Buffers
The Remote Peer can attempt to consume more than its fair share of
receive Data Buffers (i.e., Untagged Buffers for DDP or Send Type
Messages for RDMAP) if receive buffers are shared across multiple
Streams.
If resources are not shared across multiple Streams, then this attack
is not possible because the Remote Peer will not be able to consume
more buffers than were allocated to the Stream. The worst case
scenario is that the Remote Peer can consume more receive buffers
than the local ULP allowed, resulting in no buffers being available,
which could cause the Remote Peer's Stream to the Local Peer to be
torn down, and all allocated resources to be released.
If local receive Data Buffers are shared among multiple Streams, then
the Remote Peer can attempt to consume more than its fair share of
the receive buffers, causing a different Stream to be short of
receive buffers, and thus, possibly causing the other Stream to be
torn down. For example, if the Remote Peer sent enough one-byte
Untagged Messages, they might be able to consume all locally shared,
receive queue resources with little effort on their part.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 32]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
One method the Local Peer could use is to recognize that a Remote
Peer is attempting to use more than its fair share of resources and
terminate the Stream (causing the allocated resources to be
released). However, if the Local Peer is sufficiently slow, it may
be possible for the Remote Peer to still mount a denial of service
attack. One countermeasure that can protect against this attack is
implementing a low-water notification. The low-water notification
alerts the ULP if the number of buffers in the receive queue is less
than a threshold.
If all the following conditions are true, then the Local Peer or
local ULP can size the amount of local receive buffers posted on the
receive queue to ensure a DOS attack can be stopped.
* A low-water notification is enabled, and
* The Local Peer is able to bound the amount of time that it takes
to replenish receive buffers, and
* The Local Peer maintains statistics to determine which Remote
Peer is consuming buffers.
The above conditions enable the low-water notification to arrive
before resources are depleted, and thus, the Local Peer or local ULP
can take corrective action (e.g., terminate the Stream of the
attacking Remote Peer).
A different, but similar, attack is if the Remote Peer sends a
significant number of out-of-order packets and the RNIC has the
ability to use the ULP buffer (i.e., the Untagged Buffer for DDP or
the buffer consumed by a Send Type Message for RDMAP) as a reassembly
buffer. In this case, the Remote Peer can consume a significant
number of ULP buffers, but never send enough data to enable the ULP
buffer to be completed to the ULP.
An effective countermeasure is to create a high-water notification
that alerts the ULP if there is more than a specified number of
receive buffers "in process" (partially consumed, but not completed).
The notification is generated when more than the specified number of
buffers are in process simultaneously on a specific Stream (i.e.,
packets have started to arrive for the buffer, but the buffer has not
yet been delivered to the ULP).
A different countermeasure is for the RNIC Engine to provide the
capability to limit the Remote Peer's ability to consume receive
buffers on a per Stream basis. Unfortunately, this requires a large
amount of state to be tracked in each RNIC on a per Stream basis.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 33]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
Thus, if an RNIC Engine provides the ability to share receive buffers
across multiple Streams, the combination of the RNIC Engine and the
Privileged Resource Manager MUST be able to detect if the Remote Peer
is attempting to consume more than its fair share of resources so
that the Local Peer or local ULP can apply countermeasures to detect
and prevent the attack.
6.4.3.2. Remote or Local Peer Attacking a Shared CQ
For an overview of the shared CQ attack model, see Section 7.1.
The Remote Peer can attack a shared CQ by consuming more than its
fair share of CQ entries by using one of the following methods:
* The ULP protocol allows the Remote Peer to cause the local ULP to
reserve a specified number of CQ entries, possibly leaving
insufficient entries for other Streams that are sharing the CQ.
* If the Remote Peer, Local Peer, or local ULP (or any combination)
can attack the CQ by overwhelming the CQ with completions, then
completion processing on other Streams sharing that Completion
Queue can be affected (e.g., the Completion Queue overflows and
stops functioning).
The first method of attack can be avoided if the ULP does not allow a
Remote Peer to reserve CQ entries, or if there is a trusted
intermediary, such as a Privileged Resource Manager. Unfortunately,
it is often unrealistic not to allow a Remote Peer to reserve CQ
entries, particularly if the number of completion entries is
dependent on other ULP negotiated parameters, such as the amount of
buffering required by the ULP. Thus, an implementation MUST
implement a Privileged Resource Manager to control the allocation of
CQ entries. See Section 2.1, Components, for a definition of a
Privileged Resource Manager.
One way that a Local or Remote Peer can attempt to overwhelm a CQ
with completions is by sending minimum length RDMAP/DDP Messages to
cause as many completions (receive completions for the Remote Peer,
send completions for the Local Peer) per second as possible. If it
is the Remote Peer attacking, and we assume that the Local Peer's
receive queue(s) do not run out of receive buffers (if they do, then
this is a different attack, documented in Section 6.4.3.1 Multiple
Streams Sharing Receive Buffers), then it might be possible for the
Remote Peer to consume more than its fair share of Completion Queue
entries. Depending upon the CQ implementation, this could either
cause the CQ to overflow (if it is not large enough to handle all the
completions generated) or for another Stream not to be able to
generate CQ entries (if the RNIC had flow control on generation of CQ
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 34]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
entries into the CQ). In either case, the CQ will stop functioning
correctly, and any Streams expecting completions on the CQ will stop
functioning.
This attack can occur regardless of whether all the Streams
associated with the CQ are in the same or different Protection
Domains - the key issue is that the number of Completion Queue
entries is less than the number of all outstanding operations that
can cause a completion.
The Local Peer can protect itself from this type of attack using
either of the following methods:
* Size the CQ to the appropriate level, as specified below (note
that if the CQ currently exists and needs to be resized, resizing
the CQ is not required to succeed in all cases, so the CQ resize
should be done before sizing the Send Queue and Receive Queue on
the Stream), OR
* Grant fewer resources than the Remote Peer requested (not
supplying the number of Receive Data Buffers requested).
The proper sizing of the CQ is dependent on whether the local ULP(s)
will post as many resources to the various queues as the size of the
queue enables. If the local ULP(s) can be trusted to post a number
of resources that is smaller than the size of the specific resource's
queue, then a correctly sized CQ means that the CQ is large enough to
hold completion status for all the outstanding Data Buffers (both
send and receive buffers), or:
CQ_MIN_SIZE = SUM(MaxPostedOnEachRQ)
+ SUM(MaxPostedOnEachSRQ)
+ SUM(MaxPostedOnEachSQ)
Where:
MaxPostedOnEachRQ = the maximum number of requests that
can cause a completion that will be posted on a
specific Receive Queue.
MaxPostedOnEachSRQ = the maximum number of requests that
can cause a completion that will be posted on a
specific Shared Receive Queue.
MaxPostedOnEachSQ = the maximum number of requests that
can cause a completion that will be posted on a
specific Send Queue.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 35]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
If the local ULP must be able to completely fill the queues, or
cannot be trusted to observe a limit smaller than the queues, then
the CQ must be sized to accommodate the maximum number of operations
that it is possible to post at any one time. Thus, the equation
becomes:
CQ_MIN_SIZE = SUM(SizeOfEachRQ)
+ SUM(SizeOfEachSRQ)
+ SUM(SizeOfEachSQ)
Where:
SizeOfEachRQ = the maximum number of requests that
can cause a completion that can ever be posted
on a specific Receive Queue.
SizeOfEachSRQ = the maximum number of requests that
can cause a completion that can ever be posted
on a specific Shared Receive Queue.
SizeOfEachSQ = the maximum number of requests that
can cause a completion that can ever be posted
on a specific Send Queue.
MaxPosted*OnEach*Q and SizeOfEach*Q vary on a per Stream or per
Shared Receive Queue basis.
If the ULP is sharing a CQ across multiple Streams that do not share
Partial Mutual Trust, then the ULP MUST implement a mechanism to
ensure that the Completion Queue does not overflow. Note that it is
possible to share CQs even if the Remote Peers accessing the CQs are
untrusted if either of the above two formulas are implemented. If
the ULP can be trusted not to post more than MaxPostedOnEachRQ,
MaxPostedOnEachSRQ, and MaxPostedOnEachSQ, then the first formula
applies. If the ULP cannot be trusted to obey the limit, then the
second formula applies.
6.4.3.3. Attacking the RDMA Read Request Queue
The RDMA Read Request Queue can be attacked if the Remote Peer sends
more RDMA Read Requests than the depth of the RDMA Read Request Queue
at the Local Peer. If the RDMA Read Request Queue is a shared
resource, this could corrupt the queue. If the queue is not shared,
then the worst case is that the current Stream is no longer
functional (e.g., torn down). One approach to solving the shared
RDMA Read Request Queue would be to create thresholds, similar to
those described in Section 6.4.3.1, Multiple Streams Sharing Receive
Buffers. A simpler approach is to not share RDMA Read Request Queue
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 36]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
resources among Streams or to enforce hard limits of consumption per
Stream. Thus, RDMA Read Request Queue resource consumption MUST be
controlled by the Privileged Resource Manager such that RDMAP/DDP
Streams that do not share Partial Mutual Trust do not share RDMA Read
Request Queue resources.
If the issue is a bug in the Remote Peer's implementation, but not a
malicious attack, the issue can be solved by requiring the Remote
Peer's RNIC to throttle RDMA Read Requests. By properly configuring
the Stream at the Remote Peer through a trusted agent, the RNIC can
be made not to transmit RDMA Read Requests that exceed the depth of
the RDMA Read Request Queue at the Local Peer. If the Stream is
correctly configured, and if the Remote Peer submits more requests
than the Local Peer's RDMA Read Request Queue can handle, the
requests would be queued at the Remote Peer's RNIC until previous
requests complete. If the Remote Peer's Stream is not configured
correctly, the RDMAP Stream is terminated when more RDMA Read
Requests arrive at the Local Peer than the Local Peer can handle
(assuming that the prior paragraph's recommendation is implemented).
Thus, an RNIC implementation SHOULD provide a mechanism to cap the
number of outstanding RDMA Read Requests. The configuration of this
limit is outside the scope of this document.
6.4.4. Exercise of Non-Optimal Code Paths
Another form of a DOS attack is to attempt to exercise data paths
that can consume a disproportionate amount of resources. An example
might be if error cases are handled on a "slow path" (consuming
either host or RNIC computational resources), and an attacker
generates excessive numbers of errors in an attempt to consume these
resources. Note that for most RDMAP or DDP errors, the attacking
Stream will simply be torn down. Thus, for this form of attack to be
effective, the Remote Peer needs to exercise data paths that do not
cause the Stream to be torn down.
If an RNIC implementation contains "slow paths" that do not result in
the tear down of the Stream, it is recommended that an implementation
provide the ability to detect the above condition and allow an
administrator to act, including potentially administratively tearing
down the RDMAP Stream associated with the Stream that is exercising
data paths, which consume a disproportionate amount of resources.
6.4.5. Remote Invalidate an STag Shared on Multiple Streams
If a Local Peer has enabled an STag for remote access, the Remote
Peer could attempt to remotely invalidate the STag by using the RDMAP
Send with Invalidate or Send with SE and Invalidate Message. If the
STag is only valid on the current Stream, then the only side effect
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 37]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
is that the Remote Peer can no longer use the STag; thus, there are
no security issues.
If the STag is valid across multiple Streams, then the Remote Peer
can prevent other Streams from using that STag by using the Remote
Invalidate functionality.
Thus, if RDDP Streams do not share Partial Mutual Trust (i.e., the
Remote Peer may attempt to remotely invalidate the STag prematurely),
the ULP MUST NOT enable an STag that would be valid across multiple
Streams.
6.4.6. Remote Peer Attacking an Unshared CQ
The Remote Peer can attack an unshared CQ if the Local Peer does not
size the CQ correctly. For example, if the Local Peer enables the CQ
to handle completions of received buffers, and the receive buffer
queue is longer than the Completion Queue, then an overflow can
potentially occur. The effect on the attacker's Stream is
catastrophic. However, if an RNIC does not have the proper
protections in place, then an attack to overflow the CQ can also
cause corruption and/or termination of an unrelated Stream. Thus, an
RNIC MUST ensure that if a CQ overflows, any Streams that do not use
the CQ MUST remain unaffected.
6.5. Elevation of Privilege
The RDMAP/DDP Security Architecture explicitly differentiates between
three levels of privilege: Non-Privileged, Privileged, and the
Privileged Resource Manager. If a Non-Privileged ULP is able to
elevate its privilege level to a Privileged ULP, then mapping a
physical address list to an STag can provide local and remote access
to any physical address location on the node. If a Privileged Mode
ULP is able to promote itself to be a Resource Manager, then it is
possible for it to perform denial of service type attacks where
substantial amounts of local resources could be consumed.
In general, elevation of privilege is a local implementation specific
issue and is thus outside the scope of this document.
7. Attacks from Local Peers
This section describes local attacks that are possible against the
RDMA system defined in Figure 1 - RDMA Security Model and the RNIC
Engine resources defined in Section 2.2.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 38]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
7.1. Local ULP Attacking a Shared CQ
DOS attacks against a Shared Completion Queue (CQ - see Section
2.2.6, Completion Queues) can be caused by either the local ULP or
the Remote Peer if either attempts to cause more completions than its
fair share of the number of entries; thus, potentially starving
another unrelated ULP such that no Completion Queue entries are
available.
A Completion Queue entry can potentially be maliciously consumed by a
completion from the Send Queue or a completion from the Receive
Queue. In the former, the attacker is the local ULP. In the latter,
the attacker is the Remote Peer.
A form of attack can occur where the local ULPs can consume resources
on the CQ. A local ULP that is slow to free resources on the CQ by
not reaping the completion status quickly enough could stall all
other local ULPs attempting to use that CQ.
For these reasons, an RNIC MUST NOT enable sharing a CQ across ULPs
that do not share Partial Mutual Trust.
7.2. Local Peer Attacking the RDMA Read Request Queue
If RDMA Read Request Queue resources are pooled across multiple
Streams, one attack is if the local ULP attempts to unfairly allocate
RDMA Read Request Queue resources for its Streams. For example, a
local ULP attempts to allocate all available resources on a specific
RDMA Read Request Queue for its Streams, thereby denying the resource
to ULPs sharing the RDMA Read Request Queue. The same type of
argument applies even if the RDMA Read Request is not shared, but a
local ULP attempts to allocate all the RNIC's resources when the
queue is created.
Thus, access to interfaces that allocate RDMA Read Request Queue
entries MUST be restricted to a trusted Local Peer, such as a
Privileged Resource Manager. The Privileged Resource Manager SHOULD
prevent a local ULP from allocating more than its fair share of
resources.
7.3. Local ULP Attacking the PTT and STag Mapping
If a Non-Privileged ULP is able to directly manipulate the RNIC Page
Translation Tables (which translate from an STag to a host address),
it is possible that the Non-Privileged ULP could point the Page
Translation Table at an unrelated Stream's or ULP's buffers and,
thereby, be able to gain access to information of the unrelated
Stream/ULP.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 39]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
As discussed in Section 2, Architectural Model, introduction of a
Privileged Resource Manager to arbitrate the mapping requests is an
effective countermeasure. This enables the Privileged Resource
Manager to ensure that a local ULP can only initialize the Page
Translation Table (PTT) to point to its own buffers.
Thus, if Non-Privileged ULPs are supported, the Privileged Resource
Manager MUST verify that the Non-Privileged ULP has the right to
access a specific Data Buffer before allowing an STag for which the
ULP has access rights to be associated with a specific Data Buffer.
This can be done when the Page Translation Table is initialized to
access the Data Buffer or when the STag is initialized to point to a
group of Page Translation Table entries, or both.
8. Security considerations
Please see Sections 5, Attacks That Can be Mitigated with End-to-End
Security; Section 6, Attacks from Remote Peers; and Section 7,
Attacks from Local Peers, for a detailed analysis of attacks and
normative countermeasures to mitigate the attacks.
Additionally, the appendices provide a summary of the security
requirements for specific audiences. Appendix A, ULP Issues for RDDP
Client/Server Protocols, provides a summary of implementation issues
and requirements for applications that implement a traditional
client/server style of interaction. It provides additional insight
and applicability of the normative text in Sections 5, 6, and 7.
Appendix B, Summary of RNIC and ULP Implementation Requirements,
provides a convenient summary of normative requirements for
implementers.
9. IANA Considerations
IANA considerations are not addressed by this document. Any IANA
considerations resulting from the use of DDP or RDMA must be
addressed in the relevant standards.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[DDP] Shah, H., Pinkerton, J., Recio, R., and P. Culley,
"Direct Data Placement over Reliable Transports", RFC
5041, October 2007.
[RDMAP] Recio, R., Culley, P., Garcia, D., and J. Hilland, "A
Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol Specification",
RFC 5040, October 2007.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 40]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
[RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for
the Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[RFC2402] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header",
RFC 2402, November 1998.
[RFC2406] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.
[RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.
[RFC3723] Aboba, B., Tseng, J., Walker, J., Rangan, V., and F.
Travostino, "Securing Block Storage Protocols over IP",
RFC 3723, April 2004.
[RFC4960] Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission
Protocol", RFC 4960, September 2007.
[RFC793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC
793, September 1981.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April
2006.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
RFC 4949, August 2007.
[APPLICABILITY]
Bestler, C. and L. Coene, "Applicability of Remote
Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMA) and Direct Data
Placement (DDP)", RFC 5045, October 2007.
[NFSv4CHANNEL]
Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
Channels", Work in Progress, July 2004.
[VERBS-RDMAC] "RDMA Protocol Verbs Specification", RDMA Consortium
standard, April 2003, <http://www.rdmaconsortium.org/
home/draft-hilland-iwarp-verbs-v1.0-RDMAC.pdf>.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 41]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
[VERBS-RDMAC-Overview]
"RDMA enabled NIC (RNIC) Verbs Overview", slide
presentation by Renato Recio, April 2003,
<http://www.rdmaconsortium.org/home/
RNIC_Verbs_Overview2.pdf>.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
July 2003.
[INFINIBAND] "InfiniBand Architecture Specification Volume 1",
release 1.2, InfiniBand Trade Association standard,
<http://www.infinibandta.org/specs>. Verbs are
documented in chapter 11.
[DTLS] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security", RFC 4347, April 2006.
[iSCSI] Satran, J., Meth, K., Sapuntzakis, C., Chadalapaka, M.,
and E. Zeidner, "Internet Small Computer Systems
Interface (iSCSI)", RFC 3720, April 2004.
[iSER] Ko, M., Chadalapaka, M., Hufferd, J., Elzur, U., Shah,
H., and P. Thaler, "Internet Small Computer System
Interface (iSCSI) Extensions for Remote Direct Memory
Access (RDMA)", RFC 5046, October 2007.
[NFSv4] Shepler, S., Callaghan, B., Robinson, D., Thurlow, R.,
Beame, C., Eisler, M., and D. Noveck, "Network File
System (NFS) version 4 Protocol", RFC 3530, April 2003.
[NFSv4.1] Shepler, S., Ed., Eisler, M., Ed., and D. Noveck, Ed.,
"NFSv4 Minor Version 1", Work in Progress, September
2007.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 42]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
Appendix A: ULP Issues for RDDP Client/Server Protocols
This section is a normative appendix to the document that is focused
on client/server ULP implementation requirements to ensure a secure
server implementation.
The prior sections outlined specific attacks and their
countermeasures. This section summarizes the attacks and
countermeasures that have been defined in the prior section, which
are applicable to creation of a secure ULP (e.g., application)
server. A ULP server is defined as a ULP that must be able to
communicate with many clients that do not necessarily have a trust
relationship with each other, and to ensure that each client cannot
attack another client through server interactions. Further, the
server may wish to use multiple Streams to communicate with a
specific client, and those Streams may share mutual trust. Note that
this section assumes a compliant RNIC and Privileged Resource Manager
implementation - thus, it focuses specifically on ULP server (e.g.,
application) implementation issues.
All of the prior section's details on attacks and countermeasures
apply to the server; thus, requirements that are repeated in this
section use non-normative "must", "should", and "may". In some
cases, normative SHOULD statements for the ULP from the main body of
this document are made MUST statements for the ULP server because the
operating conditions can be refined to make the motives for a SHOULD
inapplicable. If a prior SHOULD is changed to a MUST in this
section, it is explicitly noted and it uses uppercase normative
statements.
The following list summarizes the relevant attacks that clients can
mount on the shared server by re-stating the previous normative
statements to be client/server specific. Note that each
client/server ULP may employ explicit RDMA Operations (RDMA Read,
RDMA Write) in differing fashions. Therefore, where appropriate,
"Local ULP", "Local Peer", and "Remote Peer" are used in place of
"server" or "client", in order to retain full generality of each
requirement.
* Spoofing
* Sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.3. For protection against many forms of
spoofing attacks, enable IPsec.
* Section 6.1.1, Using an STag on a Different Stream. To ensure
that one client cannot access another client's data via use of
the other client's STag, the server ULP must either scope an
STag to a single Stream or use a unique Protection Domain per
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 43]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
client. If a single client has multiple Streams that share
Partial Mutual Trust, then the STag can be shared between the
associated Streams by using a single Protection Domain among
the associated Streams (see Section 5.4.4, ULPs That Provide
Security, for additional issues). To prevent unintended
sharing of STags within the associated Streams, a server ULP
should use STags in such a fashion that it is difficult to
predict the next allocated STag number.
* Tampering
* 6.2.2 Modifying a Buffer after Indication. Before the local
ULP operates on a buffer that was written by the Remote Peer
using an RDMA Write or RDMA Read, the local ULP MUST ensure the
buffer can no longer be modified by invalidating the STag for
remote access (note that this is stronger than the SHOULD in
Section 6.2.2). This can be done either by explicitly revoking
remote access rights for the STag when the Remote Peer
indicates the operation has completed, or by checking to make
sure the Remote Peer Invalidated the STag through the RDMAP
Invalidate capability. If the Remote Peer did not invalidate
the STag, the local ULP then explicitly revokes the STag remote
access rights.
* Information Disclosure
* 6.3.2, Using RDMA Read to Access Stale Data. In a general
purpose server environment, there is no compelling rationale
not to require a buffer to be initialized before remote read is
enabled (and an enormous downside of unintentionally sharing
data). Thus, a local ULP MUST (this is stronger than the SHOULD
in Section 6.3.2) ensure that no stale data is contained in a
buffer before remote read access rights are granted to a Remote
Peer (this can be done by zeroing the contents of the memory,
for example).
* 6.3.3, Accessing a Buffer after the Transfer. This mitigation
is already covered by Section 6.2.2 (above).
* 6.3.4, Accessing Unintended Data with a Valid STag. The ULP
must set the base and bounds of the buffer when the STag is
initialized to expose only the data to be retrieved.
* 6.3.5, RDMA Read into an RDMA Write Buffer. If a peer only
intends a buffer to be exposed for remote write access, it must
set the access rights to the buffer to only enable remote write
access.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 44]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
* 6.3.6, Using Multiple STags That Alias to the Same Buffer. The
requirement in Section 6.1.1 (above) mitigates this attack. A
server buffer is exposed to only one client at a time to ensure
that no information disclosure or information tampering occurs
between peers.
* 5.3, Network-Based Eavesdropping. Confidentiality services
should be enabled by the ULP if this threat is a concern.
* Denial of Service
* 6.4.3.1, Multiple Streams Sharing Receive Buffers. ULP memory
footprint size can be important for some server ULPs. If a
server ULP is expecting significant network traffic from
multiple clients, using a receive buffer queue per Stream where
there is a large number of Streams can consume substantial
amounts of memory. Thus, a receive queue that can be shared by
multiple Streams is attractive.
However, because of the attacks outlined in this section,
sharing a single receive queue between multiple clients must
only be done if a mechanism is in place to ensure that one
client cannot consume receive buffers in excess of its limits,
as defined by each ULP. For multiple Streams within a single
client ULP (which presumably shared Partial Mutual Trust), this
added overhead may be avoided.
* 7.1 Local ULP Attacking a Shared CQ. The normative RNIC
mitigations require that the RNIC not enable sharing of a CQ if
the local ULPs do not share Partial Mutual Trust. Thus, while
the ULP is not allowed to enable this feature in an unsafe
mode, if the two local ULPs share Partial Mutual Trust, they
must behave in the following manner:
1) The sizing of the completion queue is based on the size of
the receive queue and send queues, as documented in 6.4.3.2,
Remote or Local Peer Attacking a Shared CQ.
2) The local ULP ensures that CQ entries are reaped frequently
enough to adhere to Section 6.4.3.2's rules.
* 6.4.3.2, Remote or Local Peer Attacking a Shared CQ. There are
two mitigations specified in this section - one requires a
worst-case size of the CQ, and can be implemented entirely
within the Privileged Resource Manager. The second approach
requires cooperation with the local ULP server (not to post too
many buffers), and enables a smaller CQ to be used.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 45]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
In some server environments, partial trust of the server ULP
(but not the clients) is acceptable; thus, the smaller CQ fully
mitigates the remote attacker. In other environments, the
local server ULP could also contain untrusted elements that can
attack the local machine (or have bugs). In those
environments, the worst-case size of the CQ must be used.
* 6.4.3.3, Attacking the RDMA Read Request Queue. The section
requires a server's Privileged Resource Manager not to allow
sharing of RDMA Read Request Queues across multiple Streams
that do not share Partial Mutual Trust for a ULP that performs
RDMA Read operations to server buffers. However, because the
server ULP knows which of its Streams best share Partial Mutual
Trust, this requirement can be reflected back to the ULP. The
ULP (i.e., server) requirement, in this case, is that it MUST
NOT allow RDMA Read Request Queues to be shared between ULPs
that do not have Partial Mutual Trust.
* 6.4.5, Remote Invalidate an STag Shared on Multiple Streams.
This mitigation is already covered by Section 6.2.2 (above).
Appendix B: Summary of RNIC and ULP Implementation Requirements
This appendix is informative.
Below is a summary of implementation requirements for the RNIC:
* 3 Trust and Resource Sharing
* 5.4.5 Requirements for IPsec Encapsulation of DDP
* 6.1.1 Using an STag on a Different Stream
* 6.2.1 Buffer Overrun - RDMA Write or Read Response
* 6.2.2 Modifying a Buffer after Indication
* 6.4.1 RNIC Resource Consumption
* 6.4.3.1 Multiple Streams Sharing Receive Buffers
* 6.4.3.2 Remote or Local Peer Attacking a Shared CQ
* 6.4.3.3 Attacking the RDMA Read Request Queue
* 6.4.6 Remote Peer Attacking an Unshared CQ
* 6.5 Elevation of Privilege 39
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 46]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
* 7.1 Local ULP Attacking a Shared CQ
* 7.3 Local ULP Attacking the PTT and STag Mapping
Below is a summary of implementation requirements for the ULP above
the RNIC:
* 5.3 Information Disclosure - Network-Based Eavesdropping
* 6.1.1 Using an STag on a Different Stream
* 6.2.2 Modifying a Buffer after Indication
* 6.3.2 Using RDMA Read to Access Stale Data
* 6.3.3 Accessing a Buffer after the Transfer
* 6.3.4 Accessing Unintended Data with a Valid STag
* 6.3.5 RDMA Read into an RDMA Write Buffer
* 6.3.6 Using Multiple STags That Alias to the Same Buffer
* 6.4.5 Remote Invalidate an STag Shared on Multiple Streams
Appendix C: Partial Trust Taxonomy
This appendix is informative.
Partial Trust is defined as when one party is willing to assume that
another party will refrain from a specific attack or set of attacks,
the parties are said to be in a state of Partial Trust. Note that
the partially trusted peer may attempt a different set of attacks.
This may be appropriate for many ULPs where any adverse effects of
the betrayal is easily confined and does not place other clients or
ULPs at risk.
The Trust Models described in this section have three primary
distinguishing characteristics. The Trust Model refers to a local
ULP and Remote Peer, which are intended to be the local and remote
ULP instances communicating via RDMA/DDP.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 47]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
* Local Resource Sharing (yes/no) - When local resources are
shared, they are shared across a grouping of RDMAP/DDP Streams.
If local resources are not shared, the resources are dedicated on
a per Stream basis. Resources are defined in Section 2.2,
Resources. The advantage of not sharing resources between
Streams is that it reduces the types of attacks that are
possible. The disadvantage is that ULPs might run out of
resources.
* Local Partial Trust (yes/no) - Local Partial Trust is determined
based on whether the local grouping of RDMAP/DDP Streams (which
typically equates to one ULP or group of ULPs) mutually trust
each other not to perform a specific set of attacks.
* Remote Partial Trust (yes/no) - The Remote Partial Trust level is
determined based on whether the local ULP of a specific RDMAP/DDP
Stream partially trusts the Remote Peer of the Stream (see the
definition of Partial Trust in Section 1, Introduction).
Not all the combinations of the trust characteristics are expected to
be used by ULPs. This document specifically analyzes five ULP Trust
Models that are expected to be in common use. The Trust Models are
as follows:
* NS-NT - Non-Shared Local Resources, no Local Trust, no Remote
Trust; typically, a server ULP that wants to run in the safest
mode possible. All attack mitigations are in place to ensure
robust operation.
* NS-RT - Non-Shared Local Resources, no Local Trust, Remote
Partial Trust; typically, a peer-to-peer ULP that has, by some
method outside of the scope of this document, authenticated the
Remote Peer. Note that unless some form of key based
authentication is used on a per RDMA/DDP Stream basis, it may not
be possible for man-in-the-middle attacks to occur.
* S-NT - Shared Local Resources, no Local Trust, no Remote Trust;
typically, a server ULP that runs in an untrusted environment
where the amount of resources required is either too large or too
dynamic to dedicate for each RDMAP/DDP Stream.
* S-LT - Shared Local Resources, Local Partial Trust, no Remote
Trust; typically, a ULP that provides a session layer and uses
multiple Streams, to provides additional throughput or fail-over
capabilities. All the Streams within the local ULP partially
trust each other, but do not trust the Remote Peer. This Trust
Model may be appropriate for embedded environments.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 48]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
* S-T - Shared Local Resources, Local Partial Trust, Remote Partial
Trust; typically, a distributed application, such as a
distributed database application or High Performance Computer
(HPC) application, which is intended to run on a cluster. Due to
extreme resource and performance requirements, the application
typically authenticates with all of its peers and then runs in a
highly trusted environment. The application peers are all in a
single application fault domain and depend on one another to be
well-behaved when accessing data structures. If a trusted Remote
Peer has an implementation defect that results in poor behavior,
the entire application could be corrupted.
Models NS-NT and S-NT, above, are typical for Internet networking -
neither the local ULP nor the Remote Peer is trusted. Sometimes,
optimizations can be done that enable sharing of Page Translation
Tables across multiple local ULPs; thus, Model S-LT can be
advantageous. Model S-T is typically used when resource scaling
across a large parallel ULP makes it infeasible to use any other
model. Resource scaling issues can either be due to performance
around scaling or because there simply are not enough resources.
Model NS-RT is probably the least likely model to be used, but is
presented for completeness.
Acknowledgments
Sara Bitan
Microsoft Corporation
EMail: sarab@microsoft.com
Allyn Romanow
Cisco Systems
170 W Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134 USA
Phone: +1 (408) 525-8836
EMail: allyn@cisco.com
Catherine Meadows
Naval Research Laboratory
Code 5543
Washington, DC 20375 USA
EMail: meadows@itd.nrl.navy.mil
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 49]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
Patricia Thaler
Agilent Technologies, Inc.
1101 Creekside Ridge Drive, #100
M/S-RG10
Roseville, CA 95678 USA
Phone: +1 (916) 788-5662
EMail: pat_thaler@agilent.com
James Livingston
NEC Solutions (America), Inc.
7525 166th Ave. N.E., Suite D210
Redmond, WA 98052-7811 USA
Phone: +1 (425) 897-2033
EMail: james.livingston@necsam.com
John Carrier
Cray Inc.
411 First Avenue S, Suite 600
Seattle, WA 98104-2860
Phone: 206-701-2090
EMail: carrier@cray.com
Caitlin Bestler
Broadcom
49 Discovery
Irvine, CA 92618
EMail: cait@asomi.com
Bernard Aboba
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way USA
Redmond, WA 98052
Phone: +1 (425) 706-6606
EMail: bernarda@windows.microsoft.com
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 50]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
Authors' Addresses
James Pinkerton
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052 USA
Phone: +1 (425) 705-5442
EMail: jpink@windows.microsoft.com
Ellen Deleganes
Self
P.O. Box 9245
Brooks, OR 97305
Phone: (503) 642-3950
EMail: deleganes@yahoo.com
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 51]
RFC 5042 DDP/RDMAP Security October 2007
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Pinkerton & Deleganes Standards Track [Page 52]
|
